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U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service

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OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

FILE: [REDACTED]
EAC 99 118 52375

Office: Vermont Service Center

Date: MAY 01 2002

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:

APPLICATION: Petition for Special Immigrant Battered Spouse Pursuant to Section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)

IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

Public Copy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Helen E. Crawford for
Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be sustained.

The petitioner is a native and citizen of Brazil who is seeking classification as a special immigrant pursuant to section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii), as the battered spouse of a United States citizen.

The director determined that the petitioner failed to establish that she is a person whose deportation (removal) would result in extreme hardship to herself, or to her child. The director, therefore, denied the petition.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner was and is of the belief that her prior attorney addressed the issue of extreme hardship that the petitioner would suffer if she were to be removed from the United States which includes, but not limited, to a job related injury. He states that he is sending a brief and/or evidence within 30 days. On April 17, 2000, counsel requests an additional 15 days in which to submit additional evidence in support of the appeal. However, no additional evidence has been entered into the record of proceeding; therefore, the record is considered complete.

8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1), in effect at the time the self-petition was filed, states, in pertinent part, that:

(i) A spouse may file a self-petition under section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) or 204(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the Act for his or her classification as an immigrant relative or as a preference immigrant if he or she:

(A) Is the spouse of a citizen or lawful permanent resident of the United States;

(B) Is eligible for immigrant classification under section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) or 203(a)(2)(A) of the Act based on that relationship;

(C) Is residing in the United States;

(D) Has resided in the United States with the citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse;

(E) Has been battered by, or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by, the

citizen or lawful permanent resident during the marriage; or is the parent of a child who has been battered by, or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by, the citizen or lawful permanent resident during the marriage;

(F) Is a person of good moral character;

(G) Is a person whose deportation (removal) would result in extreme hardship to himself, herself, or his or her child; and

(H) Entered into the marriage to the citizen or lawful permanent resident in good faith.

The petition, Form I-360, shows that the petitioner arrived in the United States in July 1993. However, her current immigration status or how she entered the United States was not shown. The petitioner married her United States citizen spouse on October 7, 1995 at Las Vegas, Nevada. On March 15, 1997, a self-petition was filed by the petitioner claiming eligibility as a special immigrant alien who has been battered by, or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by, her U.S. citizen spouse during their marriage.

At the time of the director's decision, 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1)(i)(G) required the petitioner to establish that her removal would result in extreme hardship to herself or to her child. On October 28, 2000, the President approved enactment of the Violence Against Women Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, Division B, 114 Stat. 1464, 1491 (2000). Section 1503(b) amends section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Act so that an alien self-petitioner claiming to qualify for immigration as the battered spouse or child of a United States citizen is no longer required to show that the self-petitioner's removal would impose extreme hardship on the self-petitioner or the self-petitioner's child. *Id.* section 1503(b), 114 Stat. at 1520-21. Pub. L. 106-386 does not specify an effective date for the amendments made by section 1503. This lack of an effective date strongly suggests that the amendments entered into force on the date of enactment. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 702 (2000); Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991).

As a general rule, an administrative agency must decide a case according to the law as it exists on the date of the decision. Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 710-11 (1974); United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 110 (1801); Matter of Soriano, 21 I & N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996, AG 1997); Matter of Alarcon, 20 I & N Dec. 557 (BIA 1992). For immigrant visa

petitions, however, the Board has held that, to establish a priority date, the beneficiary must have been fully qualified for the visa classification on the date of filing. Matter of Atembe, 19 I & N Dec. 427 (BIA 1986); Matter of Drigo, 18 I & N Dec. 223 (BIA 1982); Matter of Bardouille, 18 I & N Dec. 114 (BIA 1981). Even if the law changes in a way that may benefit the beneficiary, the appeal must be denied, without prejudice to the filing of a new petition, to ensure that the beneficiary does not gain an advantage over the beneficiaries of other petitions. Id.

Atembe, Drigo, and Bardouille each involved petitions under the family-based preference categories in section 203(a) of the Act. In this case, however, the beneficiary seeks classification as the spouse of a citizen. INA section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. section 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii), as amended by Pub. L. No. 106-386, section 1503, supra. As immediate relatives, the spouses and children of citizens are not subject to the numerical limits on immigration, and do not need priority dates. INA section 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. section 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). The purpose of the Atembe, Drigo and Bardouille decisions would not be served by dismissing the appeal in this case. For this reason, the appeal will be decided on the basis of section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) as amended by section 1503.

In the instant petition, the only basis for the director's denial of the petition was the failure to establish that the petitioner's removal would impose extreme hardship on the petitioner. Accordingly, as the law that exists at the time of this decision does not require the petitioner to show that her removal from the United States would result in extreme hardship to herself, or to her child, and as the director did not raise any other basis for denial, the appeal shall be sustained.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. The petitioner has met that burden and, therefore, is eligible for the benefit sought.

ORDER: The appeal is sustained, and the petition is approved.